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ABSTRACT
The obesity rate in the United States has risen significantly in the past few decades.  While a number
of economic causes for the rise in obesity have been explored, little attention has been on the role of
health insurance per se.  This paper examines obesity in the context of a model where health insurance
status can influence body weight.  We attempt to isolate the effects of ex ante moral hazard, where
people with health insurance may change their behaviors towards weight control.  We use data from
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System from 1993 to 2002 to determine the potential effect
of having health insurance on measures of body weight.  In our analyses, we control for a variety of
confounding factors that may influence body weight and address the endogenous nature of health insurance.
 Our results show evidence that having insurance is associated with higher body mass (particularly
for those above the poverty threshold) and an increased probability of being overweight.  However,
















Health insurance is widely regarded as a vital input in the production of good health, but 
is insurance always beneficial for our health?  Insurance reduces the monetary cost that 
individuals pay for health care, but this reduction can also lead individuals to change their 
behaviors.  This “moral hazard” associated with health insurance can manifest itself not only by 
altering purchasing decisions, but also by changing other health-related behaviors.  These two 
types of behavioral changes are termed “ex post moral hazard” and “ex ante moral hazard,” 
respectively (Ehrlich and Becker 1972).  It is this ex ante moral hazard in particular that may be 
bad for one’s health.  In the absence of insurance, individuals have strong incentives to engage in 
behaviors that help prevent injury and illness – for example, eating nutritious foods, exercising 
regularly, and avoiding risky activities.  In the presence of insurance, however, the incentives to 
engage in health promoting behaviors are lessened as the costs incurred from being sick are 
lowered.   
In the United States, the percentage of health care expenditures paid directly by 
consumers has been declining fairly consistently since the 1960s.  Figure 1 shows this decline by 
examining the share of total personal health care expenditures paid for by different sources:  
consumers, private sources, and governments.  Personal health expenditures include payments 
for hospital, physician and other professional care, nursing home and home health care, durable 
medical equipment, and prescription drugs.  At the same time, health care costs are increasing 
(now estimated to be rising twice as fast as inflation) and fewer people are being covered by 
health insurance.  Individuals who lose insurance have incentives to engage in preventative, 
health promoting activities, while those who have insurance and pay less out of pocket may have 
the opposite reaction.  The research question in this paper is whether insurance status is   3
associated with preventative health behaviors.  We use the case of body weights in the United 
States to answer this question. 
Body weight and obesity are desirable outcomes to study because weight may be 
plausibly affected by the availability of health insurance and the ex ante moral hazard problem.  
Most experts agree that body weight can be lowered with proper diet and exercise, making 
obesity and its associated conditions preventable by a change in behaviors not directly related to 
the receipt of medical care.  Although the “disease” status of obesity is still debated, health 
insurance for the most part does not cover weight-loss treatment and only in isolated cases does 
it cover gastric bypass surgery, which carries with it many risks and is only recommended for the 
morbidly obese.
1   
One caveat to note is that relationship between obesity and insurance can be confounded 
by the ex post moral hazard problem if insurance coverage encourages people to visit the doctor 
and they receive and follow advice to lose weight (Dave and Kaestner 2006).  However, the 
extent to which physician advice is given and followed is debatable.  Some studies have shown 
such counseling to be effective in promoting weight loss strategies (Kant and Miner 2007; 
Loureiro and Nayga 2006), while others have shown physician counseling to have a minimal 
effect on the actual behavior of patients (Wee et al. 1999; Conway et al. 1995; Nagasawa et al. 
1990; Clark 1991; Eraker et al. 1984; Ammerman et al. 1993).  Patients may exhibit certain 
characteristics atypical of nonpatients, and physician counseling is not consistent across different 
demographic groups that exhibit similar ailments (Abid et al. 2005; Taira et al. 1997; Kreuter et 
al. 1997). To help guard against the confounding effects of doctor advice, we restrict the sample 
to those individuals who report no visits to a physician in the past year. 
                                                 
1 In November of 2005, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services proposed national Medicare coverage for 
bariatric surgery procedures.  See the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services website at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1733 for more details.   4
Obesity is defined by the National Institutes of Health as having a body mass index of 30 
kg/m
2 or greater.  The percentage of individuals classified as obese has risen dramatically, 
particularly in the 1980s.  Estimates using the National Health Examination Survey show that 
12.7 percent of the U.S. population aged 18 and over were obese in the early 1960s.  The 
proportion rose slightly to 13.9 in the early 1970s and to 14.0 in the late 1970s.  By the late 
1980s and early 1990s, however, 21.6 percent of the population was classified as obese, and this 
number grew to an astounding 31.7 percent by 2004.  Obesity carries many risks for a host of 
disorders, including heart disease, hypertension, stroke, cancer, depression, and blindness (Must 
et al. 1999; Mokdad et al. 2003; RNIB 2006).   
Obesity is a national and global epidemic and has in its roots many potential causes.  A 
variety of economic causes have been explored including reductions in job strenuousness 
(Philipson 2001; Lakdawalla and Philipson 2002), technological innovation in food processing 
and preparation (Cutler et al. 2003), the growing availability of restaurants (Chou et al. 2004; 
Rashad et al. 2006), urban sprawl (Ewing et al. 2003), and time preference for the present 
(Komlos et al. 2004; Smith et al. 2005; Zhang and Rashad 2008).  Relatively few studies, 
however, have focused on the possible role of health insurance as a contributing factor to rising 
rates of obesity.  We examine obesity in the context of a model in which status of health 
insurance might play a role in determining body weights.   
As discussed in more detail below, the relationship between health insurance and obesity 
status is complicated by structural endogeneity and the potential influence of other confounding 
factors such as work status and income.  For example, individuals with higher incomes are less 
likely to be obese yet more likely to have health insurance.  Is it the case that these people would 
be even thinner had they no health insurance, as they would not discount the future heavily when   5
they are without insurance?  Or would they instead be heavier without health care, as medical 
services are believed to improve health outcomes?  In this example, the net effect of health 
insurance on body weight is ambiguous.  In general, existing theories regarding the production of 
health in the context of insurance may help guide predictions, but ultimately this is an empirical 
question.  If health insurance has a causal negative influence on good health, then moral hazard 
may be a true concern.  Yet if the opposite holds, this might lend further support for expanded or 
universal health insurance coverage due to the benefits that health insurance yields.   
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from 1993 to 
2002, we aim to uncover the effect that health insurance has on an individual’s body weight and 
obesity status.  We employ techniques to address the endogeneity of health insurance status.  To 
account for variables affecting caloric intake and expenditure, which are likely to affect weight, 
we control for state-level variables such as fast food and food at home prices, in line with recent 
work by Chou et al. (2004) and Rashad et al. (2006).   
 
II. Literature Review 
The literature examining ex ante moral hazard is somewhat limited, with many of the 
studies examining the effects of health insurance coverage on the receipt of preventative services 
(Roddy et al. 1986; Lillard et al. 1986; Cherkin et al. 1990; Card et al. 2004).  A few studies have 
examined health behaviors directly.  For example, using data from the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, Newhouse (1993) examines differences in BMI, levels of physical activities, 
smoking, and alcohol consumption among individuals enrolled in cost sharing insurance plans 
and free plans.  The results show no difference in these behaviors between the two groups.  
Kenkel (2000) also finds little evidence of a moral hazard effect in his analysis of individual   6
behaviors using the 1990 National Health Interview Survey.  His analysis suggests that people 
with private health insurance are more likely to engage in health promoting behaviors than those 
without insurance, with the one exception that men with health insurance are more likely to be 
obese.  Kenkel states that his results may be biased if omitted factors jointly determine insurance 
status and health practices.   
Courbage and Coulon (2004) examine the ex ante moral hazard question using data from 
the 2000/2001 wave of the British Household Panel Survey.  Their outcomes of interest include 
smoking and frequency of exercising which is defined as walking, swimming, or playing sports.  
Insurance in the U.K. is provided nationally to all residents; however, a secondary market exists 
where residents buy private insurance to avoid the waiting lists prevalent in the national 
insurance market.  The authors use the purchase of this secondary insurance as their test of ex 
ante moral hazard.  Using probits and an instrumental variables strategy, the authors find that 
having secondary insurance does not reduce preventative efforts and in fact may increase them.  
However, given that all residents are covered by the national insurance, these results are not 
surprising.  Their analysis essentially tests the speed of receiving care, not the presence of or 
generosity of insurance. 
  Card et al. (2004) take a unique approach to examining the relationship between health 
behaviors and insurance by looking at smoking, exercise, and obesity among the near-elderly and 
the elderly.  Eligibility for Medicare at age 65 is used as an exogenous measure of insurance 
coverage.  Using data from the 1999-2002 BRFSS surveys, they find that, in general, these 
health behaviors do not change with Medicare eligibility.  They do, however, show that being 
age 65 or older is associated with a rise in the probability of being overweight or obese among 
blacks and low-educated minorities.  Such a result is consistent with the ex ante moral hazard   7
problem, but is not consistent with the authors’ supposition that increased access to medical care 
will reduce poor health habits as doctors dispense advice on the health consequences of the 
behaviors.  The authors dismiss the positive coefficients as a product of misspecification or 
sampling error as the results seem to be driven by a downward dip in obesity just prior to age 65.   
Battacharya and Sood (2007) address the obesity externality by looking at the current 
scenario where health insurance is not risk rated for obesity, showing that coverage would 
therefore shield people from the full costs of an unhealthy lifestyle.  They estimate the welfare 
cost of obesity using the 1998 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the 1997 National Health 
Interview Survey.  Excluding the uninsured, who they presume do not face the obesity 
externality, they estimate the increase in medical expenditures for insured persons shifting from 
their optimal weights and compare this value with predetermined costs for the uninsured.  The 
authors suggest increasing the coinsurance rate, and also hint at subsidizing a healthy lifestyle by 
reducing the welfare loss through technological change that decreases the costs of engaging in a 
healthy lifestyle. 
  Our paper adds to this current literature by examining the potential for ex ante moral 
hazard using recent data for non-elderly adults.  While the randomized nature of the RAND 
study conducted by Newhouse (1993) may be the ideal sample design, those data were collected 
before the large rise in body weights seen today and the results may no longer be applicable.  
Kenkel (2000) is worried about endogeneity in his study, and we address this below. Card et al. 
(2004) examine the behavior of the near-elderly and elderly. We focus on non-elderly adults.  
Our results confirm that of Kenkel (2000) and Card et al. (2004) and show that having health 
insurance is associated with higher body weights, although there is no association with the 
probability of being obese.  Results are more robust for those above the poverty threshold.   8
   
III. Methodology 
Zweifel and Manning (2000) describe a model for ex ante moral hazard and discuss the 
determinants of the optimal amount of preventive effort exerted by an individual.  This effort is 
determined by the probability of illness, the monetary loss from illness, labor supply, wages, 
health insurance coverage, sick pay, and insurance premiums.  The benefit of engaging in 
prevention efforts is the decreased probability of suffering losses from illness, while the costs of 
prevention efforts are the opportunity costs of engaging in prevention.  In this model, prevention 
is measured in time units and monetary costs of these efforts are ignored.  However, such 
monetary costs would be included in the opportunity cost of prevention.  One important result 
that comes from this model is the theoretical ambiguity of the effects of health insurance on the 
prevention effort.  The level of insurance coverage affects premiums and these changes alter both 
the marginal costs and benefits of prevention.  The net effect is ambiguous and therefore 
becomes an empirical question.
2 
The possibility of ex post moral hazard also must be considered in making predictions of 
the effects of health insurance on obesity status.  This may arise if insurance coverage 
encourages people to visit the doctor, and the treatment they receive (perhaps in the form of 
advice) encourages weight loss (Dave and Kaestner 2006; Kant and Miner 2007; Loureiro and 
Nayga 2006).  In this case, a negative relationship would arise between insurance coverage and 
obesity.  On the other hand, there is some evidence of the minimal effectiveness of physician 
counseling on the diet and exercise behaviors of patients (Wee et al. 1999; Clark 1991; 
Ammerman et al. 1993).  Nevertheless, to help ensure that ex post moral hazard is not 
                                                 
2 See Zweifel and Manning (2000) for details.   9
confounding our results, we limit our estimation sample to only those people who have not seen 
doctor a within the past year of the survey.   
Lastly, results from the Grossman (1972) model further complicate the relationship 
between obesity and health insurance in that health status may determine insurance status, and 
other factors may influence or be influenced by both body weight and health insurance.  For 
example, those who are obese are more likely to have certain illnesses or to seek insurance 
against their potential future maladies.  Alternatively, obese persons may have a time preference 
for the present (or discount the future more heavily than non-obese persons) and choose not to 
have insurance.  We use instrumental variables to avoid these confounding effects. 
The regression in which we are most interested is of the following form: 
(1)   Body weighti= α0 + α1 HealthInsi + α2Xi + α3Ui + ε1, 
where i indexes individual observations, Body weight represents one of three measures of weight 
(discussed below), HealthIns is a dichotomous indicator for health insurance, and Xi represents 
the vector of other relevant variables such as the probability of illness, the potential monetary 
loss from illness, labor supply, and wages.  As discussed below, we include measures for income 
and education, but unfortunately, some of the variables that are important in the theoretical 
model are not available in existing data sets.  While demographic and socioeconomic variables 
will help control for some of these unobserved factors, we recognize that many of these factors 
will remain unobserved in the error term. 
Another problem to consider occurs when health insurance status is determined by 
weight:   
(2)    HealthInsi= β0 + β1Body weighti + β2Xi + β3Fi + β4Ui + ε2,   10
where the variables are the same as in equation (1), and Fi  represents variables that predict health 
insurance status but not body weight.  Given this, a simple estimation of equation (1) will yield a 
biased estimate of the coefficient on health insurance if there are common unobservable factors 
(Ui) influencing both weight ( 0 3 ≠ α ) and health insurance ( 0 4 ≠ β ), which is analogous to an 
omitted variable bias, or if weight is a determinant of health insurance status ( 0 1 ≠ β ).  Our 
estimation techniques attempt to address all of these sources of endogeneity.  Details are 
discussed below. 
  We empirically estimate equation (1) using a pooled cross-section of individuals over 
time.  Our goal is to obtain a consistent estimate the effect of health insurance on measures of 
body weight.  Assuming we are able to avoid the problems of endogeneity, a positive coefficient 
is indicative of the presence of ex ante moral hazard; that is, having health insurance leads to 
unhealthy behaviors that contribute to larger body weights.  A zero or negative coefficient will 
indicate the absence of any ex ante moral hazard effect.   
 
IV. Data 
Ten years of individual-level data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS), 1993-2002, are used in our analysis.  As the largest telephone-based health survey 
available, the BRFSS has tracked health conditions and risk behaviors for adults in the U.S. since 
1984.  The survey is conducted by state health departments in collaboration with the Centers for 
Disease Control.  Not all states are included in the early years of the data; however, forty-nine 
states plus the District of Columbia are included by 1993, our first year of analysis.  We begin in 
1993 and end in 2002 since these are the years for which information is available on all of our 
variables of interest.  These data are publicly available from the Centers for Disease Control.     11
Information on self-reported body weight and height are available in all years of data.  
Using this information, we create some measures of weight:  The Body Mass Index (BMI), a 
dichotomous indicator of being overweight or obese, and a dichotomous indicator of being 
classified as obese.  BMI is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in squared meters, 
and it is the measure that the National Institutes of Health use to track obesity over time.  The 
dichotomous indicator of overweight or obese is equal to 1 for individuals with a body mass 
index greater than or equal to 25 kg/m
2,
 and the dichotomous indicator for obesity is equal to 1 
for individuals with a body mass index greater than or equal to 30 kg/m
2.   We also examine a 
dichotomous indicator of being overweight only – that is, anyone who is recorded as obese is 
excluded from the analysis so the comparison is overweight versus normal or underweight. 
While some measures of obesity, such as biometrical impedance analysis (BIA), may be 
more superior measures of obesity (Burkhauser and Cawley 2008; Wada and Tekin 2007), they 
are costly and are not routinely measured in physical examinations.  The body mass index is a 
nationally representative measure that fairly accurately measures weight changes over time.  To 
somewhat mitigate error due to self-reports, we use objective measures of weight and height 
from the third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) to construct an 
adjusted, more accurate measure of obesity.  Because NHANES gathers information on both 
self-reported and actual weight and height, we adjust BMI in the BRFSS using this information.  
This is done separately by age, gender, and race, and has previously been used (Chou et al. 2004; 
Cawley 1999).
3 
The BRFSS data also include information on personal characteristics.  Health insurance 
is measured by a dichotomous indicator for whether or not the individual has any kind of health 
                                                 
3 We find that the correlation between BMI and adjusted BMI is 0.99.  Regression results using BMI and adjusted 
BMI are also very similar.   12
care coverage, be it from private or public sources.  Other personal characteristics include the 
following variables:  Age and age squared; gender; race or ethnic category as represented by 
indicators for white (the omitted reference category), black, Hispanic, and other race; level of 
education as represented by dichotomous indicators for less than high school (the omitted 
reference category), some high school, high school degree, and college degree; family income 
and income squared; marital status; and the number of children under 18 in the household.
4  We 
limit our sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 55.  We exclude those under age 25 
because the time preferences of these individuals may make their incentives and outcomes very 
different from older individuals.  We exclude those older than 55 to avoid potential changes in 
behaviors brought on by the anticipated receipt of Medicare.
5 
In line with Chou et al. (2004) and Rashad et al. (2006), we also include in all models 
some state-level variables that have been shown to be important determinants of obesity status 
and body weights.  These are state-level food, soft drink, and cigarette prices.  These prices are 
obtained from ACCRA and are given for various cities across the U.S. every quarter.  The 
ACCRA food-at-home price is made up of a weighted average of thirteen food prices, in which 
the weights are the reported average expenditure shares of these food items by consumers 
according to ACCRA.  These thirteen foods are: steak, beef, sausage, chicken, tuna, milk, eggs, 
margarine, cheese, potatoes, bananas, lettuce, and bread.  The ACCRA fast-food price is formed 
by taking the average prices of a hamburger (McDonald’s), a pizza (Pizza Hut), and fried 
chicken (KFC).
6  The price of a 2-liter bottle of Coca Cola is included as a proxy for soft drink 
                                                 
4 We recognize that some of these variables may be endogenous as well.  Models were tested that excluded the 
potentially endogenous variables and the conclusions remain the same. 
5 We also stratify the sample by poverty status, using yearly age- and family size-specific thresholds from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, to avoid potential changes in behaviors brought on by the anticipated receipt of Medicaid 
and due to the potential concern that those in poverty are already underinsured. 
6 More detail on these variables can be found in Chou et al. (2004).   13
prices.  Cigarette prices are included due to the metabolic and appetite suppressing effects that 
smoking may have.  A cost of living index is also reported for each city.  Before averaging prices 
in each state by quarter, we divide each price by the city’s cost of living to account for regional 
variation in prices.  The four quarters are then averaged, yielding a price for each state in each 
year.  All annual prices are divided by the consumer price index, generating real prices in 1982-
84 dollars. 
All models also include state and year indicator variables.  The state indicators will help 
to capture any unobserved time-invariant state effects which may influence obesity and may be 
correlated with health insurance status.  Time dummies are included to capture secular trends in 
obesity. 
 
V. Estimation  
We use a variety of techniques to address the problems of endogeneity of health 
insurance in the body weight equation and the confounding effects of ex post moral hazard.   
Ultimately, we rely on instrumental variable techniques to draw conclusions, but restrictions on 
the sample help minimize the influence of confounding factors.  That being said, restrictions on 
the sample limit the generalizability of our results. 
The first restriction we place on the sample is that we limit it to employed individuals.  
This restriction is useful because it helps limit the amount of unobserved heterogeneity that may 
be correlated with the body weight measures and insurance status.  The provision of health 
insurance is tied intimately to the labor market and those who are unemployed may have very 
different characteristics and incentives than employed individuals.  Also, we need this restriction 
since the instruments we use, the percentage of each state’s workforce employed in firms of   14
different size, works theoretically only for individuals who are employed.  (More details on the 
instruments are below.)  Note that many employed individuals, through the receipt of employer-
provided health insurance, may already indirectly pay for a large portion of their health 
insurance, rendering our estimates of ex ante moral hazard conservative. 
The second restriction limits the sample to those individuals who are classified as 
“healthy” and who have not visited the doctor in the past year.  Healthy individuals are defined 
as those who report that their general health is very good or excellent, and they do not report 
diabetes, high cholesterol, or any heart problems.
7  The healthy sample is considered because this 
is a group for which reverse causality, or structural endogeneity, is less likely to be an issue since 
healthy persons are unlikely to purchase insurance for health reasons.  In addition, this helps rule 
out pre-existing condition clauses that might prevent an overweight or sick person from 
purchasing insurance.  Limiting the sample to those who have not visited the doctor in the past 
year is important in order to ensure that our estimated coefficients measure the ex ante rather 
than the ex post moral hazard.  In other words, we hope to eliminate the possibility that insurance 
coverage lowers body weight.  This would occur if insurance encourages doctor visits that lead 
to treatment and advice regarding weight loss. 
In all tables below, ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit models provide baseline 
estimates.  These are compared with models that directly account for the endogeneity of health 
insurance status. 
When BMI is the dependent variable, OLS is used for the baseline model, followed by a 
two-stage least squares model with the percentage of each state’s workforce employed in firms 
of sizes 100-499 employees and 500+ employees.  These annual workforce data come from the 
                                                 
7 We realize that this is not a perfect stratification, as respondents may not fully be aware of their health status if 
they have not seen a doctor in the year prior to being interviewed.   15
U.S. Small Business Administration.  We believe that firm size is a useful instrument on a 
theoretical basis, as health insurance is strongly tied to employment in the United States, and 
firm size is a known predictor of whether health insurance is offered to employees, with 
individuals in large firms more likely to have health insurance (Fronstin 2006).  At first glance, 
the instruments appear to be as valid.  The coefficient in the first stage are positive, as predicted, 
and the F-statistic on their joint significance of 12.04 is significant and larger than the Bound et 
al. (1995) value of 10.  The instruments also pass the overidentification test indicating that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and are properly excluded from the second stage 
equation.  However, the first stage partial R-squared is extremely low, indicating that the 
instruments are very weak.  This is also evident by the fact that the TSLS coefficient on health 
insurance is extremely large relative to the OLS coefficient and it becomes statistically 
insignificant.  The Hausman test does not reject the consistency of OLS.  These results make the 
TSLS estimates untrustworthy. 
Lewbel (2007) presents an IV technique that is useful when valid external instruments are 
weak or unavailable.  This procedure relies, in part, on the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
error term of the first stage equation.  A Breusch-Pagan (1979) test confirms that this 
heteroskedasticity is present in our model.  The Lewbel IV procedure is one of TSLS that uses 
2 ˆ ) ( ε Z Z −  as the identifying instruments.  Here, Z is a vector of independent variables that may 
include any available excluded instruments, although such instruments are not a requirement and 
identification can be achieved without them.  In addition, Z may include all independent 
variables or a just subset of them.  Z  is a vector of means of the Z variables, and 2 ˆ ε  is the   16
residual from the first stage regression (health insurance on the independent variables).
8  Lewbel 
shows that this instrument can identify the parameter of interest when  0 ) , (
2
2 ≠ ε Z Cov and 
0 ) , ( 2 1 = ε ε Z Cov .  The model can be estimated by TSLS or GMM, and the usual tests for the 
validity of the instruments can be applied.  We tried both estimation procedures and the results 
are nearly identical, so the TSLS are shown.  Sabia (2007) uses this procedure to identify the 
effects of body weight on academic performance among adolescents and finds the Lewbel IV 
results to be more plausible than the TSLS results that rely on instruments of questionable 
validity. 
When the dichotomous indicators of weight are considered (overweight/obese, obese 
only, overweight only), probit estimates provide baseline and bivariate probits are used to 
account for the endogeneity of health insurance.  Identification can be achieved in the bivariate 
probit without external instruments, although we caution that this only works well when the 
distribution assumption is correct (Monfardini and Radice 2007).  Models were tested with and 
without the firm size instruments, but the results are insensitive to their inclusion.  We only show 
the models with the instruments, but given their weakness, we caution that the results will be 
biased if the assumption of joint normality is wrong. 
  
VI. Results 
 Table 1 show sample means for the full sample and separately for those with and without 
health insurance.  All three measures of body weight show a statistically significant difference in 
values for those with and without health insurance, with those having health insurance having a 
larger BMI and a higher probability of being classified as overweight.  In contrast, the 
                                                 
8 This model assumes that β1 = 0 in equation 2.  We believe that restricting the sample to healthy individuals with no 
doctor visits in the past year justifies this assumption.   17
probability of being obese is slightly lower for those with insurance than those without.  Of 
course these summary statistics do not account for any confounding factors.  It is not surprising 
that the table of means also shows that people with health insurance are more educated, are older, 
are married and have more children, and have higher incomes than those without health 
insurance. 
Table 2 shows the results for BMI.  The first column is the baseline OLS model.  The 
second column uses a TSLS with the percent of the states’ workforces in firms of different sizes 
as instruments.  Column 3 presents results from the Lewbel IV, with no external instruments, and 
finally, Column 4 shows the Lewbel IV with the external instruments.  The coefficient on having 
a health plan is positive in all models, and is statistically significant in the OLS and Lewbel IV 
models.  As discussed above, the TSLS models are not trustworthy because of the weak 
instruments.
9  However, the Lewbel IV models appear to perform well.  The instruments have 
strong first stage F-statistics, pass the overidentification test, and the Hausman test rejects the 
consistency of the OLS coefficient.  The magnitude of the Lewbel IV coefficient is not sensitive 
to the inclusion of the external instruments (which is not surprising given their low predictive 
power), and indicate that a switch from no health insurance to having health insurance is 
associated with an increase in the BMI of 0.25 kg/m
2.  To put this into context, consider an 
average male who is 5’10” tall and weighs 185 lbs.  His BMI is 26.2.  An increase in one unit of 
BMI translates into a weight gain of 7.1 pounds for this man, so a 0.25 unit increase is a weight 
gain of about 1.8 pounds.  Coefficients reported in the Appendix, where the sample is stratified 
by poverty status, show that the statistically significant results are being driven by those above 
the poverty threshold and not by those officially classified as poor. 
                                                 
9 An IV model was tested using LIML, which may perform better than 2SLS with weak instruments.  The results of 
the two estimation procedures were almost identical.   18
To test the threshold effects, we next turn to an analysis of whether having health 
insurance is associated with the probabilities of being classified as 1) overweight or obese, 2) 
overweight only, or 3) obese.  Table 3 shows the results.  The presence of health insurance is 
positively related to the probabilities of being overweight/obese and of being overweight.  The 
effects appear to be concentrated on the threshold between normal weight and overweight since 
the models for obesity show no statistically significant effect of health insurance on the 
probability of being obese.  All these conclusions hold whether the probit or bivariate probit is 
considered.  Using the bivariate probit results, having insurance is associated with an increase of 
11.1 percentage points in the probability of being overweight.  The implication here is that there 
does appear to be an ex ante moral hazard effect, where individuals who have health insurance 
have less incentive to engage in preventative behaviors.  However, the effect is small in terms of 
additions to BMI, and it is concentrated only along the normal-overweight boundary.  There is 
no apparent effect of health insurance on the probability of being obese. 
 
VII. Discussion 
Few would argue that health insurance is undesirable.  The benefits of insurance to the 
health and welfare of individuals are highly valued, and are sometimes viewed as one of the 
basic human rights.  But of course health insurance is not without costs, and the moral hazard 
problems associated with insurance add to these costs.  This paper examines one particular 
manifestation of the moral hazard problem, the ex ante moral hazard as it pertains to body 
weight.  Our hypothesis is that in the presence of insurance, people have less incentive to guard 
against illness and change their health-related behaviors (i.e., poor diet and less exercise) 
accordingly.  Using a large data set of individuals, we estimate the relationship between health   19
insurance status and body weight accounting for the possible endogeneity of health insurance 
coverage.   
Our results suggest a small, but measureable ex ante moral hazard problem, particularly 
for employed individuals above the poverty threshold.  Having health insurance is associated 
with an increase in BMI of 0.25 kg/m
2, or approximately 1.8 additional pounds on an average 
male.  The presence of health insurance is also associated with an increase in the probability of 
being classified of overweight; however, there is no statistically significant effect on the 
probability of being classified as obese.  We caution that the results from our study are not 
directly comparable to that of other studies, nor are they generalizable to the adult population 
because of the restrictions we place on the sample.  We limit our sample to those who are 
employed, in good health, and have no reported doctor visits in the past year.  This is done to 
minimize the propensity for reverse causality from body weight to health insurance status and to 
mitigate the potential for ex post moral hazard to confound our results.   
In conclusion, our results demonstrate that health insurance can lead certain individuals 
to change health related behaviors and to gain weight; however, the magnitude is small and the 
effect is concentrated only along the boundary of overweightedness.  Obesity is not affected by 
the presence of health insurance.  In other words, Americans are not getting fat because of their 
health insurance.   20
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Table 1 













BMI  Body mass index, measured as weight 








Overweight/obese  Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 









Overweight*  Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
BMI is equal to or greater than 25 
kg/m








Obese   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 









Health insurance   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
respondent has some form of health 







High school   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
respondent completed exactly 12 







Some college   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
respondent completed at least 13 
years but fewer than 16 years of 







College   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 















Black   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 







Hispanic   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 







Other race   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 








Male   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 







Number of children  Number of children in the household 







Real family income   Real household income in thousands 







Married   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 







Divorced  Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 
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Widowed   Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if 







Food at home price   Real state ACCRA food at home 
price divided by (the cost of 







Fast food price   Real state ACCRA fast food price 
divided by (the cost of living*the 







Soda price    Real state ACCRA Coke price 
divided by (the cost of living*the 







Cigarette price  Real state ACCRA cigarette price 
divided by (the cost of living*the 








*Sample omits individuals classified as obese.  N=92,086. 
Note:  Difference between those with health insurance and those without health insurance is statistically significant at the 
10% level for all variables except the food at home price and cigarette price.   
 
 
 Table 2 
Effects of Health Insurance on BMI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Health insurance  0.147***  2.270  0.247***  0.249*** 
  (3.78) (0.85) (4.04) (4.06) 
High  school  -0.090 -0.320 -0.101 -0.101 
  (1.32) (1.08) (1.47) (1.47) 
Some college  -0.113  -0.392  -0.126*  -0.127* 
  (1.64) (1.10) (1.82) (1.82) 
College  -0.695*** -1.045** -0.712***  -0.712*** 
 (9.97)  (2.34)  (10.15)  (10.15) 
Age 0.071***  0.057**  0.071***  0.071*** 
  (4.29) (2.26) (4.25) (4.25) 
Age  squared  -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
  (1.15) (0.23) (1.11) (1.11) 
Black 1.246***  1.265***  1.247***  1.247*** 
  (18.47) (17.53) (18.48) (18.48) 
Hispanic 0.688***  0.722***  0.690***  0.690*** 
  (10.76) (9.30) (10.79)  (10.79) 
Other race  -0.619***  -0.582*** -0.617*** -0.617*** 
  (8.27) (6.57) (8.25) (8.25) 
Male 1.309***  1.326***  1.310***  1.310*** 
  (47.36) (37.99) (47.38) (47.38) 
Number of   0.087***  0.099***  0.087***  0.087*** 
children  (7.07) (4.97) (7.11) (7.11) 
Income -0.004  -0.041  -0.006**  -0.006** 
  (1.46) (0.88) (2.03) (2.04) 
Income  squared  0.00001 0.0003 0.00002  0.00002 
  (0.25) (0.81) (0.82) (0.82) 
Married 0.142***  0.012  0.136***  0.136*** 
  (3.60) (0.07) (3.43) (3.43) 
Divorced -0.390***  -0.403***  -0.390***  -0.390*** 
  (8.66) (8.31) (8.67) (8.67) 
Widowed  0.021 -0.022 0.019 0.019 
  (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Food at home   -0.042  0.104  -0.035  -0.035 
price  (0.07) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) 
Fast food price        -0.065  -0.004  -0.062  -0.062 
  (0.34) (0.02) (0.32) (0.32) 
Soda  price  0.050 -0.069 0.045 0.045 
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) 
Cigarette  price  0.029* 0.022 0.028*  0.028* 
  (1.73) (1.17) (1.71) (1.71) 
Observations  109,788 109,788 109,788 109,788 
F-test on     12.04  951.92  906.24 
instruments   [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Overidentification     0.534  94.845  97.773 
test   [0.465]  [0.0943]  [0.1128] 
Hausman test    0.58  4.49  4.58 
   [0.447]  [0.034]  [0.032] 
   28
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  Models also 
include state indicators, year indicators, and missing observation indicators for price variables.  Instruments are the 
percent of the workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           29
Table 3 
Marginal Effects of Health Insurance on Probabilities of Overweight and Obese 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Overweight/obese  Overweight  Obese 
  Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit Probit Biprobit 
Health insurance  0.019***  0.093***  0.020***  0.111***  0.004  0.016 
  (4.13) (4.07) (4.01) (4.52) (1.30) (0.84) 
High school  0.015*  0.008  0.032***  0.022**  -0.015***  -0.016*** 
  (1.92) (0.90) (3.51) (2.32) (2.80) (2.84) 
Some college  0.006  -0.003  0.021**  0.009  -0.016***  -0.017*** 
  (0.77) (0.39) (2.32) (0.93) (2.85) (2.86) 
College  -0.055*** -0.067*** -0.029*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.054*** 
  (6.75) (7.53) (3.15) (4.42) (9.56) (8.67) 
Age 0.008***  0.007***  0.007***  0.007***  0.003**  0.003* 
  (3.85) (3.56) (3.29) (3.01) (1.98) (1.91) 
Age squared  -0.00002  -0.00002  -0.00003  -0.00002  -0.000001  0.0000003 
  (0.98) (0.73) (1.03) (0.78) (0.04) (0.02) 
Black  0.100*** 0.101*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
 (12.90)  (12.96)  (7.75)  (7.80)  (12.86)  (12.88) 
Hispanic  0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (12.63)  (12.76)  (11.24)  (11.41)  (6.25)  (6.28) 
Other race  -0.083***  -0.082***  -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
  (9.42) (9.25) (8.18) (8.00) (5.09) (5.05) 
Male  0.210*** 0.210*** 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 (65.02)  (65.11)  (69.02)  (69.01)  (4.60)  (4.63) 
Number of   0.008***  0.009***  0.006***  0.006***  0.005***  0.005*** 
children  (5.62) (5.89) (3.59) (3.90) (4.71) (4.75) 
Income 0.001***  0.00001  0.003***  0.001*  -0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (4.20) (0.02) (7.73) (1.82) (5.87) (3.74) 
Income squared  -0.00001*** -0.000001 -0.00002*** -0.00001* 0.00001***  0.00001***
  (4.14) (0.25) (6.99) (1.76) (4.35) (3.06) 
Married 0.043***  0.038***  0.052***  0.046***  0.005  0.004 
 (9.25)  (7.90)  (10.17)  (8.56)  (1.45)  (1.15) 
Divorced -0.012**  -0.012**  0.007  0.007  -0.029***  -0.029*** 
  (2.24) (2.33) (1.25) (1.13) (7.90) (7.92) 
Widowed  0.016 0.014 0.018 0.015 0.002 0.001 
  (1.02) (0.92) (1.02) (0.89) (0.15) (0.12) 
Food at home   -0.026  -0.021  -0.050  -0.046  0.039  0.040 
price  (0.38) (0.30) (0.65) (0.61) (0.78) (0.80) 
Fast food price        -0.032  -0.030  -0.054**  -0.050**  0.024  0.024 
  (1.40) (1.30) (2.14) (1.99) (1.40) (1.42) 
Soda price  0.010  0.006  -0.003  -0.008  0.031  0.030 
  (0.22) (0.13) (0.05) (0.16) (0.90) (0.88) 
Cigarette price  0.002  0.002  0.0003  0.00002  0.003**  0.003* 
  (0.95) (0.83) (0.14) (0.01) (1.99) (1.96) 
Observations 109,788  109,788  92,086  92,086  109,788  109,788 
Rho   -0.106  -0.132  -0.028 
Chi






Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  Marginal effects 
reported.  Models also include state indicators, year indicators, and missing observation indicators for price 
variables.  Instruments are the percent of the workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       30
 
Appendix 
Effects of Health Insurance on BMI, by Poverty Status 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







Health  insurance  0.444***  1.765 0.459 0.486 
  (2.84) (1.00) (0.56) (0.68) 
Observations  4,769 4,769 4,769 4,769 
 
Not In Poverty 
 
Health insurance  0.134***  5.872  0.220***  0.222*** 
  (3.30) (0.73) (3.47) (3.49) 
Observations  105,019 105,019 105,019 105,019 
 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, p-values in brackets, and intercept not shown.  Models also 
include education, age, race/ethnicity, gender, number of children, family income, marital status, prices, state 
indicators, year indicators, and missing observation indicators for price variables.  Instruments are the percent of the 
workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 